



Are Foundation Grant Programs a
Panacea or a Problem? Part :3
By Daniel G. Swaine
I n 1977, the Connecticut State Supreme Court declared
in Horton v. Meskill I that Connecticut’s mosdy locally
funded school finance system was unconstitutional. While
the court decision concluded that absolute spending equal-
ity was not required, it stated that any reform must eliminate
the relationship between per-pupil expenditures and per-pupil
wealth -- the principle of wealth neutrality stressed in most
such court decisions. In 1979, Connecticut implemented a
guaranteed tax base (GTB) formula. The court affirmed that
this was constitutional in 1985 in its follow-up decision in
Hortan v. Meskill IlL In 1990, the legislature changed the
state aid formula from a GTB formula to a foundation grant
formula.
In 1998, four Connecticut school districts (Bridgeport,
New Britain, Seymour, and East Hartford) filed a lawsuit
(Johnson v. Rowlana), arguing that the state had failed to ful-
fill the Horton v. Meskill I mandate. One of the reasons for
this alleged failure, the plaintiffs said, was a decline in the
share of educational costs borne by the state, a decline that
began in 1990 with the switch to a foundation grant for-
mula. The plaintiffs have asked the court to enforce the com-
bined 1977 and 1985 Horton v. Meskilldecisions. Because
the court has not said that a foundation grant formula is
constitutional, ifa ruling in this case favors the plaintiffs, the
state may be compelled to return to the GTB formula that
the court affirmed was constitutional in 1985. In this issue
of Fiscal Facts, we discuss elements of the policy dilemma
that faces state decision-makers as a result of the Johnson v.
Rowland lawsuit.
Practical Consequel~ces of
D~plelnel~ti~g a GTB Reform
In its 1978-79 session, the Connecticut legislature en-
acted a series of measures that implemented a GTB formula
(see FiscalFacts, Spring/Summer 1999, for information on
GTB formulas). The guaranteed wealth level (or GTB) was
set at the 98th percentile in per-pupil wealth. No district
with wealth above the GTB would receive aid, but neither
would such districts be subject to revenue recapture -- pay-
ments made to the state that would be redistributed to prop-
This article is Part 3 of a four-part series on schoo[f!-
nance reform in New England. Part 1 ( Fiscal Facts, ~alV
Winter 1998) discussed the legal strategies that have
been used to challenge school financing and the th~ee
main approaches schools have followed in narrowing
spending disparities. Part 2 (Spring/Summer 1999).
looked at the effectiveness of guaranteed tax base.f0i~
mulas in achieving wealth neutrality and/or spending:.(
equality. Part 4 will discuss educational performance[rb~:
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erty-poor districts. This meant that 98 percent of all districts ~vere eligible to receive state aid under the
GTB program.
During a six-year phase-in period, the legislature enacted many modifications to the basic GTB
funding formula. Three modifications directly affected the operation of the GTB system:
¯ A switch from reimbursing current, or one-year-old, expenditures to reimbursing three-year-old
expenditures.
¯ The establishment of a minimum expenditure requirement (or MER), forcing each district to
spend above a stipulated minimum in order to qualify for GTB aid.
¯ The establishment of a cap on the amount of aid that a district could receive.
The first modification -- a switch from reimbursing one-year-old expenditures to reimbursing
three-year-old expenditures -- was designed to mitigate the effects of implicit price subsidies contained
in a GTB formula. These subsidies alter district spending behavior and hinder the ability to achieve
~vealth neutrality through property tax-base equalization. The rate of the price subsidy varies inversely
with a district’s property wealth -- property-poor districts have relatively large subsidies, while prop-
erty-rich districts have relatively small or negligible subsidies. According to economic theory, the lower
purchasing prices for education experienced by poor districts as a result of the subsidy will canse them
to increase their educational spending relative to richer districts. These price-induced spending in-
creases will be in addition to the greater spending allowed by equalizing property tax bases. Thus, the
price subsidy may invert the normal positively sloped wealth/spending relationship, rather than achieve
the zero slope necessary for wealth neutrality. Reimbursing three-year-old expenditures attempts to
mitigate the inversion by breaking the link between the rate of price subsidy for a district and its current
spending behavior.
The second modification -- the establishment of a minimum spending requirement, or MER--
was designed to force all districts to achieve some minimum, or foundation, level of spending. The
MER for all districts was originally set at the median spending level. However, this was modified for
districts with wealth levels below the median. They were required to tax themselves only at the median
tax rate, with the result that a different minimum expenditure requirement was applied to each district
with a wealth level below the median. In 1983, the MER was set at the 75th percentile of per-pupil
spending in three-year-old data, but once again was applied only to districts that ~vere above the me-
dian wealth level.~
The final modification to the GTB formula -- a cap on the amount of aid that a district could
receive --was designed to limit the potential cost of the program to tile state treasury. The cap was set
so that no district could receive an amount in state aid that exceeded its minimum expenditure require-
merit.
The many different restrictions that were legislatively imposed on the GTB formnla during the
phase-in created a funding system that was cumbersome, diflqcult to understand, and hard to adminis-
ter. Because of these problems, in 1990, Connecticut replaced the GTB program with a much simpler
foundation grant formula, called the Educational Cost Sharing (or ECS) formula.
Meohanios of Foundation Grant Aid
Compared with the restricted GTB formula that was implemented in Connecticut, foundation
grant formulas are easier to understand and administer. A foundation fommla requires t~vo pieces of
information: the foundation expenditure level, which may be the same for all districts, and the required
local contribution, which varies inversely with local property wealth. In a foundation system, state aid
is equal to the foundation spending gap: the foundation spending level less the required local contribn-
tion. The required local contribution is equal to a state-determined target tax rate times tile level of
1 For 1988 to 1989, the last year of the GTB program, the MER for regular program expenditures was $5,215 in 1997 dollars.Foundation Grants and Wealth Neutrality
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local property wealth. Typically, m systems without revenue
recapture provisions, districts in which the foundation gap is
greater than zero receive foundation grant aid, while districts
with a foundation gap of zero or less receive no aid.
To illustrate how foundation aid is calculated using these
two pieces of information, let’s construct an example using
three hypothetical districts. The first district, which we will
call the foundation district, has per-pupil property wealth of
$423,933 and spends at a level of $5,300. Let’s assume that
the state sets the foundation expenditure level at $5,300. Let’s
also assume that the state sets the tax rate for the required
local contribution at the rate that will achieve the founda-
tion spending of $5,300 for a district with a wealth level of
$423,933: a rate of 0.0125 for this example ($5,300/
$423,933). With the foundation spending level set at $5,300,
mid the required local contribution equal to $5,300, the foun-
dation gap for the foundation district is zero, and it will not
receive foundation grant state aid.
Now let’s consider t~vo additional districts. The second
district has per-pupil property wealth of $200,000. The third
district has per-pupil property wealth of $1,259,000. For the
second district, the required local contribution is $2,500 per
pupil (0.0125 X $200,000), while for the third district, it is
$I 5,738 (0.0125 X $I,259,000). The second district would
receive foundation grant state aid totaling $2,800 per pupil
($5,300 less $2,500). The third district can easily achieve the
foundation expenditure if it taxes at the required tax rate, so
it would not be eligible to receive foundation grant state aid.
But, in a foundation system with revenue recapture provi-
sions, the third district would have to pay $10,438 ($5,300
less $15,738) per pupil back to the state for redistribution to
property-poor districts that spend below the foundation.
Foundation Grant Forn~nllas
and YVealth Neutrality
Can a foundation grant system achieve wealth neutral-
ity? Chart ] answers this question in the aflqrmative, under
certain conditions. Chart 1 is based on 1997 data for 10
statistically representative Connecticut school districts that
are "deciles.’’2 The expenditure levels that are plotted on the
positively sloped line in Chart I represent the estimates of
what each district would spend on education in the absence
of state foundation aid grants (that is, "no aid"). We call this
line the "no aid" spending relationship.3 The flat line with
squares for data points represents the 1997 foundation ex-
penditure level for regular program expenditures of approxi-
mately $5,300.4 As the chart shows, this foundation spending
level is identical to the estimated "no aid" spending level of
the fourth decile district -- approximately the 40th percen-
tile. The flat line with diamonds for data points represents
the spending level of the top decile district -- which is near
the 100th percentile. The flat lines on the chart are impor-
The districts have been constructed so that each contains exactly 10
percent of statewide enrollment -- a docile of students. The method of
construction is as follows: First, the districts are arranged so that ￿}roFerty
wealth levels are in ascending order, from smallest to largest. Next, the
districts are clustered into 10 groups each containing 10 percent of
statewide enrollment. Finally, weighted averages of the property wealth
and spending levels are calculated for each of the 10 groups, with the
weights being the actual student enrollment levels of each district. With
this method of construction, the 10 districts are statistically representative
of the actual property wealth levels and spending levels of the districts
that make up the deciles.
By "no aid," we mean an aid level of $250 per pupil for each district.This is
the minimum aid that has historically been granted in the state of
Connecticut, a figure that preexisted the Herren case and the GTB
formula. In order to project what district spending levels would be without
state equalizing aid, we statistically estimate a multiple linear regression
with actual spending rates (spending levels divided by property wealth) as
the dependent variable, and with the natural logarithm of property wealth
and the actual dollar level of state aid as the two independent variables.
Estimated "no aid" spending rates are calculated using this equation by
replacing actual state aid with a flat minimum aid grant of $250 per pupil.
The calculated spending rates are then multiplied by property wealth to
obtain estimated "no aid" spending levels for all districts.The estimated
spending levels are then grouped into deciles, following the procedure
described in the previous footnote. Because these spending levels were
estimated with a nonlinear relationship, in order to simplify the plot of this
relationship, the grouped data are linearized with a simple regression
using the estimated spending levels for each decile as the dependent
variable and the property wealth levels for each decile as the independent
variable. Because the predicted values from this regression are
guaranteed to fall on a straight line, it is these values that are plotted on
Chart 1.
School spending numbers that are typically reported are for net current
expenditures, which include all education expenditures except school
construction expenses, and expenses for transporting students. The
foundation spending level for net current expenditures was about $5,700
per pupil in 1992 On the other hand, regular program expenditures, the
spending concept that we use throughout this article, subtracts
expenditures for special education from net current expenditures.tant, because if spending levels were the same for all districts,
there would be no correlation between per-pupil property
wealth and per-pupil spending levels, and the system would
be wealth neutral.
In order for a foundation grant system to achieve wealth
neutrality, the state aid formula must alter district behavior
so that districts spend according to a flat spending line, rather
than a positively sloped spending relationship. State
policymakers might use two alternatives to achieve this goal.
Chart 1 illustrates both approaches. The first alternative
employs revenue recapture provisions. Consider the second
and eighth decile districts on Chart 1 :
¯ The second decile district has a wealth level of
$232,883 per pupil and spends $4,858 with no aid. If
we give this district an aid grant equal to the differ-
ence between the foundation spending level of $5,300
and the "no aid" spending level of $4,858, this district
could achieve the fouudation spending level provided
that it does not change the level of tax effort that is
implied by the "no aid" relationship.
¯ The eighth decile district has a wealth level of $595,058
per pupil and spends $6,242 ~vith no aid. If we im-
pose a tax on this district (negative state aid or rev-
enue recapture) exactly equal to the difference between
the "no aid" spending level of $6,242 and the founda-
tion spending level of $5,300, this district would be
forced to reduce its spending to the foundation spend-
ing level. We again assume that the district does not
alter its tax effort.
Without revenue recapture, the only way for a founda-
tion system to achieve wealth neutrality is for policymakers
to raise the foundation to the spending level achieved by
districts that are near the top of the wealth distribution. On
Chart 1, the flat line with dianmnds for data points repre-
sents this spending level. Consider the procedure that we
described above for the second decile district, but using the
higher foundation spending level. If we employ this proce-
dure to distribute foundation grants to virtually all districts,
then wealth neutrality could be achieved, provided that dis-
tricts do not change the level of tax effort implied by the no
aid spending relationship.
Using either alternative, it is theoretically possible for a
foundation grant system to achieve wealth neutrality. How-
ever, in practice, achieving wealth neutrality is difficult. Re-
call that foundation grant aid is equal to the foundation gap:
the difference between the foundation spending level and
the spending level that state policymakers set as the required
local contribution. Three conditions are necessmy for a foun-
dation system to achieve wealth neutrality:
¯ First, "no aid" district spending levels and the required
local contribution must be identical. Typically, they
are not identical.
¯ Second, with the receipt of an aid grant, each district
must continue to raise the amount of funds for edu-
cation that it would have raised in the absence of the
aid grant.
¯ Third, each district must spend the entire amount of
its foundation aid grant on education. In practice, state
aid grants enhance the revenue, or income, of the dis-
trict, and this changes the district’s spending behavior
in a way that may not be intended by policymakers.
Some portion of the income enhancement- the aid
grant -- will be spent on education, but some por-
tion will also "leak out" of education to be spent on
other forms of municipal government spending or on
property tax relief. This kind of behavior exemplifies




Has Connecticut’s foundation grant system achieved
wealth neutrality? And if not, what has it achieved? Chart 2
answers these questions. The positively sloped line with circles
for data points is the estimated "no aid" spending relation-
ship that we used in Chart 1. Now, consider the positively
sloped line with diamonds for data points. The expenditure
levels that are plotted on this line represent estimates of ac-
tual expenditures on education in 1997.5 We call this line
the "actual" spending relationship. The flat line with squares
for data points is the foundation spending line that we used
in Chart 1. Finally, the line segments highlighted in gray show
the level of spending that we would expect from a foundation
program without revenue recapture-- the type of foundation
program employed by Connecticut-- assuming no change in
tax effort. We call this "anticipated" spending.
A glance at the "actual" spending relationship reveals
that Connecticut’s foundation grant program clearly has not
achieved wealth neutrality. Because policymakers chose a fairly
5 Because factors other than wealth and state aid influence local district
spending, actual spending levels would be scattered around the line
plotted in Cha~ 2. In order to simplify the chart for expositional purposes,
we linearize the actual spending levels with a simple regression that uses
the actual spending levels for each decile as the dependent variable and
the property wealth level for each decile as the independent variable.The
proiected spending levels from this regression are guaranteed to fall on a
straight line, and it is these spending levels that are plotted for the














4,500 I I I I I
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200
Per-Pupil Property Wealth (Thousands of Dollars)
1,4oo
low foundation spending level, the main reason that wealth
neutrality has not been achieved is the absence of revenue
recapture. As the highlighted line shows, anticipated spend-
ing itself is not wealth neutral. If Connecticut’s foundation
system hasn’t achieved wealth neutrality, what has it achieved?
Chart 2 also answers this question: Foundation grants have
raised spending for the bottom districts to the foundation
level, but wealthier districts are still spending more. In fact,
in the absence of revenue recapture, this is as much as this
particular foundation system can hope to achieve.
Why Does "Actual" Spending
Exceed "Anticipated" in
Ahnost All Districts?
Districts are not spending as expected for two reasons:
¯ More districts than anticipated are receiving an en-
hanced aid grant because a "hold-harmless" provision
was inserted into the foundation grant law.
¯ The practical consequences of the "income effect"
change local district spending behavior from what we
anticipated.
Connecticut policymakers granted districts "hold harm-
less" aid when the switch to the foundation program occurred.
What are the effects of"hold harmless" aid? The anticipated
spending levels highlighted in Chart 2 suggest that founda-
tion aid should be paid only to those districts with wealth
levels below $348,000 per pupil -- approximately the 40th
percentile in the wealth distribution. However, in the prior
GTB system, the guaranteed wealth level was set at the 98th
percentile, so that 98 percent of all districts were eligible to
receive aid. Providing "hold harmless" aid attempted to make
each district at least as well offunder the new policy as under
the old. This meant that the target wealth level for the re-
ceipt of foundation aid grants had to be set very high, even
though the foundation spending level was set fairly low.
In the 1996-97 school year, the target wealth level for
receiving foundation aid was set at a value of $657,200 per
pupil -- the 82nd percentile in the wealth distribution.6
Thus, approximately 82 percent of all districts received foun-
dation grant aid. The remaining districts received the mini-
mum aid level - traditionally $250 per pupil, but in 1990
the level of minimum aid was also increased. As a result,
"hold harmless" aid vastly expanded the number of districts
eligible to receive enhanced aid grants. The practical effects
of"hold harmless" aid can be seen in Chart 2 in the com-
parison between actual spending and "no aid" spending.
Actual spending exceeds "no aid" spending for all districts
because actual spending incorporates state aid grants for vir-
tually all districts.
How does the "income effect" change local district be-
havior? To answer this question, let’s look at the behavior of
the fifth decile district. In 1997, this district received foun-
dation grant aid of about $2,100 per pupil. How much of
this grant was actually spent on education? As Chart 2 shows,
actual school spending for the fifth decile district was about
$6,000 per pupil, while estimated "no aid" school spending
was about $5,500. Thus, out of the $2,100 foundation aid
grant, this district increased educational spending by $500
per pupil, while directing $1,600 per pupil to other munici-
pal expenditures or tax relief. Policymakers typically impose
spending restrictions on how foundation grant aid can be
used, but Chart 2 shows that these spending restrictions were





Chart 3 compares the wealth/spending relationship for
the GTB system in 1989 (the last year of the program) to the
wealth/spending relationship for the foundation grant sys-
tem in 1997. The more steeply sloped line with diamonds
for data points represents the wealth/spending relationship
estimated for the foundation program in 1997. The less
steeply sloped line represents the wealth/spending relation-
ship for the GTB program in 1989, with both spending and
6 The value of $657,200 is 1.55 times the median wealth level.Comparing Spending Relationships
in 1989 and in 1997
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wealth levels expressed in inflation-adjusted 1997 dollars. As
Chart 3 shows, wealth levels in 1989 were significantly higher
than wealth levels in 1997, and the degree of disparity in
wealth levels was greater in 1989.
Both of the wealth/spending relationships have positive
slopes. Even though the GTB program did not achieve wealth
neutrality, spending was somewhat less responsive to differ-
ences in wealth (that is, the GTB relationship was closer to
being wealth neutral than the foundation relationship). The
positive slope to the GTB relationship occurs either because
imperfect methods were used to compensate for the GTB
pricing subsidy, or because other factors not equalized by the
GTB program are correlated with both wealth and spend-
ing. A caveat needs to be applied to these comparisons. Be-
cause of differences in the two wealth distributions, a more
appropriate comparison could be made if the GTB program
were applied to the 1997 wealth distribution. But this com-
parison can be accomplished only by resorting to simulation
methods.7
The correct comparison requires simulating district behavioral responses
to the two systems using the same wealth base. How each district
responds to the rules of the system (behavior) determines the
effectiveness of each respective system, given the underlying distribution
of property wealth. Since the two periods have different wealth
distributions, one could reasonably expect that district behavior would also
be different, and an adequate comparison becomes difficult to make in the
absence of a behavioral simulation.
I~plications and
Conclusions
In this and in our previous article, we showed that both
a GTB system and a foundation grant system can achieve
wealth neutrality in theory. However, it is difficult for either
system to achieve wealth neutrality in practice. First, legisla-
tors find it difficult to impose the revenue recapture provi-
sions that are necessary in order for either system to achieve
wealth neutrality. Second, each redistribution system leads
to behavioral responses that can defeat the goal of achieving
wealth neutrality.
As discussed in the previous issue of FiscalFacts (Spring/
Summer 1999), a GTB system contains price subsidies that,
if ignored, tip the slope of the wealth/spending relationship
from positive to negative. To avoid this, the GTB formula
must be modified to compensate for these price subsidies. In
the GTB system implemented from 1979 to 1989, Con-
necticut countered the lack of revenue recapture by setting
the GTB at a very high level (98th percentile). Connecticut
also attempted to modify the GTB formula to compensate
for the pricing subsidies, but despite this modification a posi-
tive relationship between wealth and spending remained.
Foundation grant systems rarely impose revenue recap-
ture provisions, and Connecticut’s Educational Cost Shar-
ing program is no exception. However, without revenue
recapture, a foundation system cannot achieve wealth neu-
trality, unless policymakers set the foundation at the spend-
ing level of the wealthiest districts, a step that would be cosdy
to the state treasury. The result is a system left to achieve the
less ambitious goal of establishing a floor beneath district
spending levels. Foundation systems are usually successful in
achieving this purpose, as has been the case in Connecticut.
But, in foundation grant systems, a behavioral incentive
known as the "income effect" implies that state aid funds
will leak away from education towards other forms of spend-
ing. F’F’Across t}~e Region
Revenue growth across the region was less robust in FY99 than in FY97 or FY98.
Slower growth resulted from the effects of previously enacted tax cuts that were
phased in during FY99, combined with slower business tax collections due to overseas
economic turmoil. Tax revenue surpluses ranged from a low of 1.7 percent of revenues in
Massachusetts to a high of 7.6 percent of revenues in Connecticut. In FY2000, many New
England states are spending down surpluses accumulated in past years, or are returning
them to taxpayers. FY2000 budget growth will average between 6 percent and 8 percent
for most states in the region -- somewhat more rapid than FY99 tax revenue growth. Tax
cuts dominated the legislative agenda in five of the six New England states. Only New
Hampshire, preoccupied with educational finance problems created by the Claremont case,
deviated from this trend.
Final State Appropriations for FY99 and
Enacted Appropriations for FY2000a
Excluding Federal Dollars
FY99 FY00 Percent
Millions of Dollars Change
Connecticut 9,498.0 10,039.0 5.7
Maine 2,426.1 2,574.4 6.1
Massachusettsb 16,111.0 17,311.2 7.4
New Hampshirec 1,236.1 1,341.6 8.5
New Hampshired 1,236.1 2,028.4 64.1
Rhode Islande 2,801.7 2,965.0 5.8
Vermontf 1,427.4 1,474.6 3.3
a Unless otherwise noted, includes general fund and transportation fund appropriations only.
Excludes expenditure of federal grants and reimbursements. b FY99 spending is the amount enacted by the legislature as of June 30,1998.
FY00 spending is the amount passed by each house of the legislature during the spring of 1999.
~ Includes budgeted income from sweepstakes earmarked for foundation aid and special education.
Includes new state educational funding measure enacted in response to Claremont et al v. Governor et al. ~ Includes general revenue and other unrestricted funds.
Includes Act 60 spending.
Sources: Official budget documents, state financial statements, and conversations with state budget officials.Six-State Review
Connecticut
Connecticut ended FY99 with total tax collections of
$8.4 billion, up 2.4 percent over FY98. Sales and income tax
collections led the way, growing 5.1 percent and 5.7 percent,
respectively, significantly less than revenue estimators had
projected. Most business income taxes declined substantMly,
slowing overall revenue growth. The weakness in business
tax collections is attributable to a continued phase-in of pre-
viously enacted tax cuts, as well as lower business profits in
the face of weak demand from overseas customers.
According to final figures, Connecticut realized an FY99
general fund tax revenue surplus of $591.7 million. Also, the
Comptroller’s office released a report on August 31 stating
that Connecticut recorded a combined general and trans-
portation fund budget surplus of $124.6 million in FY99.
The $124.6 million breaks down as follows: the $591.7
million tax revenue surplus, less an initial built-in deficit of
$140.4 million budgeted for FY99, less $326.7 million in
net supplemental appropriations.
In mid-June, the legislature enacted and the governor
signed a $10 billion own-source revenue budget for FY2000,
up 5.7 percent from the $9.5 billion that the Comptroller’s
Office said was spent in FY99. However, because final FY99
spending was $393 million (4.3 percent) greater than origi-
nally appropriated, the FY2000 budget is 10.3 percent above
initial FY99 appropriations. Highlights of the FY2000 bud-
get include:
¯ A $50 per-person sales tax rebate totaling $110 mil-
lion. A second tax reduction of$15 million eliminates
sales taxes on home improvements.
¯An income tax cut in the form of an increase of $75 in
the property tax credit for households with incomes
of less than $43,000 and property tax bills of at least
$500. This tax cut will cost an estimated $44 million
in FY2000.
¯ A reduction in the hospital gross earnings tax rate from
7.25 percent to 4.5 percent, reducing revenues by
nearly $50 million.
¯ $55 million of the budget surplus to be spent on school
construction.
¯ $150 million from the tobacco settlement to be used
to freeze tuition and fees in the state public higher
education system. The budget sets aside an additional
$23 million from the tobacco settlement to be depos-
ited iuto a trust fund for health programs.
¯ Authorization of a $300 million bond offering for the
Adriaen’s Landing development project located in
Hartford, Connecticut.
Maine
Maine collected an estimated $2.3 billion in tax rev-
enues during FY99, up 5.2 percent fi’om FY98. Income tax
collections led the wa); with a growth rate of 12 percent,
indicative of a very strong labor market. The reduction in
the sales tax rate from 6 percent to 5 percent effective Octo-
ber 1 slowed sales tax collections from a 4.4 percent increase
(a base-to-base comparison) to a 1.3 percent decline. This
tax cut cost the state $47 million, but its full impact was not
felt because it took effect part way through the fiscal year.
On a full-year basis, the cost would have been $72.5 million
in FY99. Corporate tax collections were also down by 1 per-
cent for the ),ear. Lowered profitability from overseas eco-
nomic turmoil was the primary reason for the decline. Despite
disappointing results in some tax components, overall rev-
enue growth exceeded budgeted projections, resulting in an
estimated $77.6 million general fund revenue surplus for
FY99.
The legislature enacted a $29.8 million supplemental
appropriation for FY99, bringing FY99 own-source spend-
ing to an estimated $2.4 billion, up 10.3 percent over FY98
expenditures. In late June, the legislature finalized FY2000
spending plans by enacting a $2.6 billion own-source rev-
enue budget, up 6.1 percent from FY99. Despite the rev-
enue loss from the sales tax cut, revenue estimators forecasted
that final FY99 growth in tax revenues (using a base-to-base
comparison) would once again exceed 8 percent, thereby trig-
gering another 0.5 percentage point reduction in the sales
tax rate. Legislators decided to forestall this trigger by enact-
ing an additional 0.5 percentage point reduction in the sales
tax effective January 1, and then repealing the automatic trig-
ger. FY2000 budget highlights are as follows:Revenues from the Two Largest Taxes
in Each New England State
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Spending."
¯ $60 million in new spending for local schools: $36
million in new general purpose aid and $24 million
for school construction.
¯ $23 million for research and development grants
awarded to the University of Maine.
Tax Cuts ($204 million):
¯ $120 million for the repeal of the hospital tax.
¯ $40 million additional tax relief for homeowners.
¯ $40 million tax reduction for new equipment pur-
chases by businesses.
¯ An additional 0.5 percentage point cut in the sales tax
rate, from 5.5 percent to 5 percent.
Revenue hwreases ($24 millio~O:
¯ A 3 cents per gallon hike in the gasoline tax, raising
$21 million.
¯ A $2 hike in auto registration fees, raising $3 million.
Massaohusetts
The Commonwealth collected a total of $14.2 bil-
lion in taxes during FY99, up a very weak (but better
than expected) 1.7 percent over FY98 collections. Given
the large reduction in personal income taxes that was en-
acted with the FY99 budget, weak growth in tax collec-
tions was expected by the administration, which had
projected flat revenue growth for the year. The slightly
stronger than expected revenue growth resulted in a
$244.7 million revenue surplus for FY99. Sales tax collec-
tions paved the way to the revenue surplus, growing a bet-
ter-than-expected 10.4 percent during FY99.
Three months into FY2000, the Commonwealth has
yet to enact a budget for the current fiscal year. This inaction
is the restdt of a disagreement between Senate President Tho-
mas Birmingham and House Speaker Thomas Finneran over
spending priorities and the enactment of additional tax cuts.
The House and Senate passed very different budget and tax
reduction proposals, and the conference committee appointed
by the two legislative leaders has been unable to resolve the
differences between them. Because the amount of any new
tax cuts will greatly influence the expected rate of growth in
revenues during FY2000, and since the amount of any new
spending depends upon this expected growth, the budget
process has been held hostage to this disagreement. State
government is operating, but under a series of interim
monthly budgets that fund government services at FY99
spending levels.
New Hampshire
New Hampshire collected $940.3 million in tax rev-
enues during FY99, up 4.9 percent from FY98. Revenues
from business taxes (business profits tax and business enter-
prise tax) and from the meals and rooms tax grew most rap-
idly, by 7.9 percent and 6.1 percent, respectively. Because
receipts from these taxes are heavily influenced by the tour-
ism industry, their relatively strong performance is evidence
that the tourist business was quite healthy during the past
f~scal year. As a result of this strong performance, New Hamp-
shire realized a $62.1 million tax revenue surplus for FY99.In late June, the legislature enacted a $2.03 billion own-
source revenue budget for FY2000, up 64.1 percent from
adjusted FY99 expenditures. These figures include the $825
million school financing bill passed in response to the state
Supreme Court’s decision in the Claremont case (see Fiscal
Facts, Spring/Summer 1999). On a basis comparable to ear-
lier years, the own-source revenue budget for FY2000 is up
8.5 percent (or $105.4 million) over adjusted FY99 expen-
ditures. About half of the $105.4 million spending increase
is devoted to just three areas: a $20 million increase in local
aid, a $26 million increase in the human services budget,
and a $5 million increase (up 7.0 percent) in the public higher
education budget.
Despite having passed a school finance reform bill at the
end of April, the Claremont case and school funding remain
an issue for three reasons. First, the school funding appro-
priations bill that was enacted last spring left an estimated
$100 million deficit that has yet to be addressed by
polio/makers. Second and third, tile state is facing two new
school finance court challenges: a suit filed by the Claremont
plaintiffs with the Supreme Court in late August, and a suit
that is expected to be filed by property-rich districts during
the fall.
Recall that the Claremont decision has two components:
(1) that property tax rates for education should be equal across
districts, and (2) that tile state has a responsibility to fund an
"adequate" education (see FiscalFacts, Fall/Winter 1998). The
court did not define the cost of an adequate education, and
the new education financing law used an arbitrary method
to set the level of educational funding at $825 million. Herein
lies the basis for the new case filed by the Claremont plain-
tiffs. The $825 million figure is too low, the Claremont plain-
tiff~ say, because it funds only 62 percent of the estimated
$1.33 billion spent by local districts during the past academic
year. Critical of the arbitrary way in which the state arrived
at the $825 million, the Claremont plaintiffs have asked the
court to appoint a court master to arrive objectively at an
adequacy cost figure. In addition, their suit ,asks the court to
remove six allegedly unconstitutional features of the new law.
In October, the Supreme Court ruled that the provision in
the new law phasing in a uniform property tax over five years
was unconstitutional, throwing school financing in New
Hampshire again into turmoil.
Rhode Island
Rhode Island collected $1.7 billion in tax reveuues in
FY99, up 2.6 percent, slightly less than the 3.4 percent grmvdl
projected by the admMstration at mid-year. Consistent with
a strong labor market, personal income tax revenues grew
5.0 percent from FY98 levds despite a 0.5 percentage point
reduction in the income tax rate. Sales tax collections also
exhibited strong growth of 6.2 percent. Both taxes met mid-
year projections. However, on a less sanguine note, business
income tax collections declined 7.6 percent during FY99.
Overseas economic turmoil combined with past business tax
rate reductions was responsible for the weaker-than-expected
results. Rhode Island realized a $97.9 million general fund
revenue surplus in FY99. Offsetting the revenue surplus was
a $28.2 million (1.4 percent) supplemental appropriation,
~vhich, when combined with a built-in budget deficit of $93.7
million euacted in June 1998, left a $24.0 million general
fund operating budget deficit for FY99.
At the end of June 1999, the legislature enacted and the
governor signed into law a $3.0 billion own-source budget
for FY2000, up $163.3 million, or 5.8 percent, fi’om the
final FY99 spending figure. Most of this increase is devoted
to two separate initiatives to increase state aid to municipali-
ties. By far the lion’s share reflects the continuation of a
planned ten-year phase-in of a local property tax reduction
enacted in June 1998 (see Fiscal Facts, Fall/Winter 1998).
Tile revenue that is lost as the tax is phased out must be
replaced with new state aid. The second initiative is an in-
crease of $38 million in aid for local education. Finally, the
budget act affects future state revenues by continuing the
third in a series of five planned 0.5 percentage point reduc-
tions in the personal income tax rate. This year, the tax rate
falls fiom 26.5 percent to 26 percent of federal tax liability.
Vermont
b), Pei Zhu
Vermont enjoyed tax revenue growth of 5.8 percent in
FY99, slightly higher than projected growth of 5.2 percent.
Meals mid rooms tax collections were up 8.1 percent, fol-
lowed by an 8.0 percent increase in corporate tax revenues.
Sales and use tax and personal income tax collections also
grew, by 5.6 percent and 5.0 percent, respectively. The state
closed FY99 with an operating budget surplus of $60 mil-
lion. Most of this surplus is designated to finance a series of
one-time capital projects, such as the purchase of the Cham-
pion lands, construction of a new prison, and related im-
provements in file town of Springfield. kaly remaining surplus
will be transferred to various reserve funds.
For FY00, an own-soume revenue budget of $1.47 bil-
lion was enacted into law in late June. It reflects a 3.3 percent
increase over FY99 levels and is about 1.9 percent larger than
that proposed by Governor Dean in January. The budgetcontains no significant changes in spending priorities.
In June, the legislature passed Act 49, which makes sev-
er~ amendments to Act 60 (the educational finance reform
law), as well as modifications in other state tax laws and in
the collection of administrative fees. The major provisions of
this act are the following:
1. The need for local-option education property taxes
will be reduced in various ways: (a) An injection of $36
million in state fimds into the local option property tax rev-
enue sharing pool will permit the guaranteed equalized yield
to be at least $42.09 per capita in FY00, m~ increase from the
$40.00 per capita that was originally expected)’-’ Bm esti-
mated 213 toxvns receive aid fiom the revenue sharing pool,
while 47 towns contribute to the revenue sharing pool. (b)
Additional state funds will be used to reimburse school trans-
Guaranteed yield means that a 1 percentage point increase in the local
option tax rate is guaranteed to yield every districi. $42.09 per capita in tax
revenue.
portation expenditures. (c) The current state-fimded block
grant will be indexed for inflation. (d) The $75,000 income
cap for homesteads v’alued at $160,000 or less ~vill be re-
moved, a measure designed to increase benefits for the own-
ers of business proprietorships.
2. Personal income tax rates will be reduced from 25
percent to 24 percent of the federal liabilit); starting Ja,mmy
1, 2000. The reduction is estimated to cost the state $6.7
million in FY00.
3. Each article of clothing that costs $110 or less will be
excluded fi’om sales taxation, beginning December 1, 1999.
This will rednce tax revenues by an estimated $6.1 million in
FY00. The exemption will be expanded to footxvear as of
July 1,2001. l~[P
2 $11 million is funded by a transfer from the General Fund into the sharing
poo!. The remaining amount is from funds currently held in tbe Education
Fund. The legislature appropriated $36 million for the FY01 budget as well.
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